You know all those big mouths with big guns who are ready to invade and kill anyone and everyone who threatens the U.S.? You know them. We all know them. I suggest they read this book. Nothing is ever as easy or as simple as is vomited forth on FoxNews or in a Rambo-esque steroid- and testosterone-laden action movie. And while I'm openly criticizing, being able to have a beer with an individual should not be the qualifying factor that elects her or him president. There is a large amount of rich food for thought in this book. The problem begins with big guns. The problem finishes with cool-headed critical thinking. ( )

The best single volume analyzing the defining moment in the nuclear age, the original edition of Essence of Decision is a classic work that has influenced generations of students, scholars, and policy makers. The new edition of this best-selling text includes comprehensive synthesis of all new evidence -including recently declassified Kennedy taps and Soviet files. Not only revised, but completely rewritten, the new edition provides deeper and clearer answers to an enduring question: how should citizens undertand the actions of their government? ( )

Excellent work that not only analyzes the Cuban Missile Crisis in depth, but explains the realities behind rational decision-making for individuals, States, and various organizations. This is an excellent source for the study of organizational behavior, and the fact that seeming irrational actions are sometimes the consequence of rational decisions. ( )

Allison and Zelikow use evidence from the Cuban missile crisis to explain that our standard and intuitive explanations of world events (based on a rational model of action performed by relatively monolithic players: "the United States is getting out of Iraq to focus its resources on Afghanistan", for instance) is insufficient. They present two other models, one focused on organizational processes and the other on individuals jostling and bargaining within organizations, and they convincingly show that these models sometimes complement and sometimes supersede the rational model of action. The theoretical chapters are a difficult read for a layperson like me, but the intensity of the crisis and the variety of explanations that can be drawn from it is fascinating. ( )

A classic in the field of IR and foreign policy analysis, not just for its conclusions (that foreign policy is better understood as the product of complex bureaucratic negotiations than as the result of an abstracted unitary rationale actor) but also for its case study methodology. ( )