Norman PodhoretzKirja-arvosteluja

This book makes a valiant but not totally successful effort to explain why Jews "earn like Episcopalians and vote like Puerto Ricans." The attachment to Jewish causes is well-known and legendary. Jews are active in academia, government and entertainment, as well as the professions. While most support Israel, on other issues most are quite liberal, almost socialist. Mr. Podhoretz tries to explain this contradiction.

He takes us on a long and rather interesting trek through European and then American history. Mr. Podhoretz demonstrates how, until Roosevelt, the Democrats/liberals were almost always aligned with the Jews. The Jews made Roosevelt his hero, notwithstanding his treachery. Thereafter things get more complicated. The Jews continue, with the notable exception of Jimmy Carter's 1980 election, to vote Democratic with more than a 60% margin. The closest he comes to a convincing explanation (spoiler alert) is a one-paragraph reference to genetics that I find rather convincing.

His lengthier explanation is that liberalism and tikkun olam have beome like a Torah in and of itself; and unfalsifiable religion. To me that's a cop-out; it's saying "it is because it is." However, the book is interesting and well worth reading, as much for provoking disturbing thought than it is for answering the question "Why Are Jews Liberals?"

A Strong Argument that the Cold war was WW III and ended with USSR breakup and that we have entered into WW IV ever since Islamic Terrorism Started and Its fully engaged since 9-11

Stopped reading.

1737 Why We Were in Vietnam, by Norman Podhoretz (read 5 Aug 1982) Somewhat to my surprise I read this based on a recommendation by a conservative columnist. Podhoretz concludes we were in Vietnam for idealistic reasons, though it was imprudent to attempt what we did. I sturdily supported our Vietnam policy until 1968, when I became more dovish--but my heart was never really in my dovishness, though despising Nixon as I did I could be easy about opposing things he did. But this book is so rightist that it turned me off some, too. But the book is a good antidote to the liberal line on Vietnam.½

This is a quick and easy read but one to stir up controversy if you follow his argument. There are not many people willing to take a positive view of the neocons, since currently they are regularly lampooned publicly, nor many who would dare say that Bush is right on foreign policy but Podhoretz is one such person who will. The closest analogy to Bush he argues is Truman in 1947 who unpopularly enunciated his Doctrine of containment against the Soviets. Eisenhower although differing in many ways did not alter the Truman Doctrine. Podhoretz argues that the Bush Doctrine of preemptive action against our enemies is correct and will be proven true historically.

The main elements of the Bush Doctrine were delineated in a National Security Council document, the National Security Strategy of the United States, published on September 20, 2002, as updated in 2006, it states:

“It is an enduring American principle that this duty obligates the government to anticipate and counter threats, using all elements of national power, before the threats can do grave damage. The greater the threat, the greater is the risk of inaction – and the more compelling the case for taking anticipatory action to defend ourselves, even if uncertainty remains as to the time and place of the enemy’s attack. There are few greater threats than a terrorist attack with WMD. To forestall or prevent such hostile acts by our adversaries, the United States will, if necessary, act preemptively in exercising our inherent right of self-defense."

There is another group categorized by Podhoretz as the Realists. Henry Kissinger is in this school of thought as an application of Wilsonism revisited. This school saw a balance of power as ideal, they emphasized stability, and the ideal state is that established in the Treaty of Westphalia. In contrast to the liberal internationalists, the realists have no problem with using power when it is needed.

Pre-911 Bush was a realist, a policy he abandoned with the demise of the towers. Bush stated:

"For decades, free nations tolerated repression in the Middle East for the stake of stability. In practice, this approach brought little stability and much oppression, so I have changed this policy (p. 133)."

Bush repudiated the realist school.

He went beyond what the internationalists thought possible. Not only did he retaliate against Afghanistan, they attacked us so we hit back, but Bush was committed to regime change as well, and he attacked Iraq also.

The hope of the internationalists and the realists then became the prospect of defeat in Iraq. Typical of this view is the realist, who when mixed with a bit of the internationalist, sees defeatism as welcomed as in Jimmy Carter's Secretary of State.

The Bush doctrine may be seen in direct contrast to the failed policies of Zbigniew Brzezinski. He considered Iraq a "hopeless battle" (p. 139); his policies "emboldened the Iranians to seize American hostages" (p. 139); then, his boss, the disastrous Jimmy Carter waited for over a year to attempt a hostage rescue, which led to an bungled attempt at rescue; and, Brzezinski was blind to the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan.

Podhoretz uses this book to defend the "Bush Doctrine" of foreign policy as it pertains to the War on Terror. He spends a great deal of time comparing this doctrine to those of previous administrations, all the way back to Truman.

He first defines the current struggle as a true world war in every sense of the word, and defends his position (and that of the President) that it must be won.

He also spends a good deal of time defining the positions of those aligned against the doctrine, to include the politcal Left and Right.

There is very little time spent discussing the enemy he describes as Islamofascists. The main point of the book is directed at the West's reaction to the threat.½

A shrill warning in 1980 that the Soviets were about to win the Cold War. It's especially absurd in hindsight, but it probably achieved its objective. It will make a nice addition to my "Red Menace" collection. (Podhoretz went on to warn that Iraq, and then Iran, was a direct threat to U.S. security. He's a putz, in other words.)

I've read that neocons are optimists while paleocons are pessimists. That sentiment is certainly true of this short book. Podhoretz is certainly a Bush supporter in nearly every foreign policy decision, and is confident that the Bush Doctrine will survive. This is based on history's disproving of all other strategies (realpolitik, liberal internationalism).

While I was hoping for a treatise on how America needs to mobilize for what Podhoretz calls World War IV, this book is basically a rehash of how we got to where we are today (or better, where we were in late 2006). It's amazing to read the political comments made by both sides that showed the unity of opinion early on as compared to what the current situation. He also looks at the parallels to the domestic bickering in WWII and WWIII (the Cold War).

All in all, it's interesting and would be a good primer for those who've not paid too close attention the last 6 years. However, if you're looking for a book on suggested policies to win the war (something more Gingrich-esque) this is not it.