Good intermediate account of Napoleon's military career which makes fair judgments. Let down by maps which are hit and miss. ( )

This work does not claim to be definitive but is more simply a brief review of Napoleon as military commander. To that end, it is certainly serviceable. The illustrations and maps could have been more deftly placed and integrated better with the text but the work is clear enough. In addition, although it does not claim to be about Napoleon the man, the quotations from private letters and notes about his relationship with his family and early private life is instructive.

Napoleon's mother was a shrewd and calculating woman who none the less loved her children very much. She believed in corporal punishment for her children, which would have a significant impact on Napoleon's views of the world in later years (p. 14).

"The Corsicans were by nature addicted to mutual suspicion and political intrigue, and this taint certainly showed itself in Napoleon's future behavior. Not only did it mark his negotiations with enemies and allies, but it also marred his handling of his military subordinates; he never dealt frankly with them, but made a habit of playing off one against the other (p. 14)."

Tsar Alexander I of Russia was once an ally of Napoleon; they had signed the Treaty of Tilsit in 1807, a period when Napoleon was in no position to attack Russia (Glover, p. 160; Marshall-Cornwall, p. 219). The tsar and Napoleon planned to divide Europe if Alexander helped Napoleon in his Continental System.

Many countries objected to this system, and Russia became unhappy with the economic effects of the system as well (Glover, p. 161). Yet another cause for concern was that Napoleon had enlarged the Grand Duchy of Warsaw that bordered Russia on the west, all without notifying his supposed ally (Glover, p. 161; Marshall-Cornwall, p. 219). In addition, Napoleon at first proposed to marry for the second time to a Russian princess but he snubbed Russia to engage the Austrian Marie-Therese without notifying the Russians (Glover, p. 161).

In any case, perhaps the biggest but unstated reason was that Europe could not accommodate two egos as large as Napoleon's and the Tsar's on one continent. The war could have been avoided but it was not.

"The causes which brought about the rupture between the Emperor the Tsar are numerous and complex; Napoleon's main motive was that he could not tolerate a on the boundary of his Empire the existence of a Power which was not entirely subservient to his own will. Napoleon had already beaten the Russians in battle (1806-1807 leading to Tilsit, Marshall-Cornwall, pp. 177-178) and he had formed a poor opinion of their leadership. Once they were finally beaten, he could create a strong Poland as a buffer state and satellite of France. Unfortunately, Napoleon decided to conquer Russia before he had succeeded in conquering Spain (Marshall-Cornwall, p. 219)."