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Ladataan... Bombs, Cities, and Civilians: American Airpower Strategy in World War IITekijä: Conrad Crane
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Kuuluu näihin sarjoihinModern War Studies (1993)
As the might and capabilities of American airpower have grown during the last 60 years, so has the controversy about its use in the intentional and indiscriminate wartime bombardment of civilians. In Bombs, Cities and Civilians, Conrad Crane maintains that, for the most part, American airmen in World War II remained committed to precision bombing doctrine. Instead of attacking densely populated urban areas simply to erode civilian morale, Army Air Forces adhered to a policy that emphasised targeting key industrial and military sites. He demonstates that while the British, Germans and Japanese routinely conducted indiscriminate aerial bombardment of enemy cities, American airmen consistently stayed with daylight raids against carefully selected targets, especially in Europe. Daytime precision missions were usually far more dangerous than night area attacks, but such Army Air Forces tactics increased bombing efficiency and also reduced the risk of civilian casualties. Kirjastojen kuvailuja ei löytynyt. |
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Google Books — Ladataan... LajityypitMelvil Decimal System (DDC)940.54History and Geography Europe Europe 1918- Military History Of World War IIKongressin kirjaston luokitusArvio (tähdet)Keskiarvo:
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Japan, of course, was a different story. There just weren’t that many “precision” targets to bomb, and, since the B29s flew at a higher altitude than B17s and B24s it was harder to hit the targets. With a comment I’ve never considered before, Crane points out that high altitude winds were strong and variable enough to also cause major problems with bombing accuracy. This lead to LeMay’s decision to use low altitude night fire raids, something even he had reservations about. Crane doesn’t mince words with the horrors, but he also points out that alternative strategies involved entirely destroying Japan’s transportation and electrical grids, dropping herbicides in rice fields, and even bombing schools of fish off the coast, with the implication that the alternative to agonizing but quick death in an inferno was agonizing but slow death from starvation. Crane also notes that all Japanese men between 15 and 60 not already in the military, and all Japanese women between 17 and 40, were conscripted into the People’s Volunteer Corps, and thus were technically not civilians, and mentions Prince Konoye’s comment that the B29 fire raids were the fundamental reason for Japan’s surrender. In that context, the atomic bombings are almost an afterthought.
The last part of the book concerns the US air campaigns in Korea, Vietnam and DESERT STORM (the book was written in 1993 and thus was too early for Kosovo and Iraq II). He’s quite critical of US military planning for Korea and Vietnam, noting that the experience in Japan should have proved that precision bombing just doesn’t work against Third World countries; however, he grants that the advent of smart bombs and the advantage of being able to operate against enemy troops in the open lead to a different situation in Iraq I. Although he does confirm that most of the Iraqi military losses were to Coalition ground troops, the disruption and moral problems created by bombing greatly contributed to victory.
An easy a quick read, with a lot of interesting things not covered in other military histories. ( )