KotiRyhmätKeskusteluLisääAjan henki
Etsi sivustolta
Tämä sivusto käyttää evästeitä palvelujen toimittamiseen, toiminnan parantamiseen, analytiikkaan ja (jos et ole kirjautunut sisään) mainostamiseen. Käyttämällä LibraryThingiä ilmaiset, että olet lukenut ja ymmärtänyt käyttöehdot ja yksityisyydensuojakäytännöt. Sivujen ja palveluiden käytön tulee olla näiden ehtojen ja käytäntöjen mukaista.

Tulokset Google Booksista

Pikkukuvaa napsauttamalla pääset Google Booksiin.

Ladataan...

Democratic Authority: A Philosophical Framework

Tekijä: David M. Estlund

JäseniäKirja-arvostelujaSuosituimmuussijaKeskimääräinen arvioKeskustelut
491520,832 (4.5)-
Democracy is not naturally plausible. Why turn such important matters over to masses of people who have no expertise? Many theories of democracy answer by appealing to the intrinsic value of democratic procedure, leaving aside whether it makes good decisions. In Democratic Authority, David Estlund offers a groundbreaking alternative based on the idea that democratic authority and legitimacy must depend partly on democracy's tendency to make good decisions. Just as with verdicts in jury trials, Estlund argues, the authority and legitimacy of a political decision does not depend on the particular decision being good or correct. But the "epistemic value" of the procedure--the degree to which it can generally be accepted as tending toward a good decision--is nevertheless crucial. Yet if good decisions were all that mattered, one might wonder why those who know best shouldn't simply rule. Estlund's theory--which he calls "epistemic proceduralism"--avoids epistocracy, or the rule of those who know. He argues that while some few people probably do know best, this can be used in political justification only if their expertise is acceptable from all reasonable points of view. If we seek the best epistemic arrangement in this respect, it will be recognizably democratic--with laws and policies actually authorized by the people subject to them.… (lisätietoja)
-
Ladataan...

Kirjaudu LibraryThingiin nähdäksesi, pidätkö tästä kirjasta vai et.

Ei tämänhetkisiä Keskustelu-viestiketjuja tästä kirjasta.

This is a great work in political philosophy and I certainly enjoyed reading it. It's very well written and it covers new ground in a penetrating and interesting manner. It offers far more food for thought than the average book in this field. The author's argument, as he summarizes it on p.38-39, is that "an epistemic approach to politics, morally constrained by a general acceptability requirement, generates a philosophically adequate basis for political authority".

First he discusses proceduralism - the thesis that democratic authority is justified by its fair procedures - and finds it insufficient by itself. Next he argues that democratic authority can also be epistemically justified due to its capacity to produce good decisions. Joining these two elements together, he defends his theory of "epistemic proceduralism" and discusses an analogy between democracy and juries at some length. All of the above basically constitutes the first half of the book, chapters 1-8.

The second half of the book, chapters 9-14, dives deeper into the problems of political knowledge. In these chapters the author explains why democratic arrangements produce "better decisions than random, and better than alternative arrangements, so far as can be determined within public reason" (p.160). He also discusses speech situations in democratic deliberation and rejects J.S. Mill's views on unequal voters and Condorcet's jury theorem of voting. All of these chapters are good, but they're a bit separate from each other and their contribution to the main argument in chapters 1-8 isn't all that big.

In the final chapter the author writes that "hopeless" normative political theory is needed even though its ideal theories have very little hope of being implemented in practice. Since this is another good chapter my criticism may be a bit misplaced, but I was bothered by this book's lack of realism on one particular point. Its arguments, especially those in the second half, are clearly geared towards direct democracy - situations where people decide directly by vote without intermediaries. Representative democracy is mentioned in passing on only three occasions (on pages 161, 182 and 260 by my count). The author hints that his arguments would apply to representation as well with a few caveats, but I wasn't exactly convinced. I would have liked to see at least one chapter on democratic representation in this book.

Maybe other works will eventually fill that gap. But in conclusion I think this is a path-breaking work. Epistemic theories of democracy have been around for a while, but there's still a lot of thinking to be done. This book sets a good standard and should inspire useful theorizing for a long time to come.
  thcson | Nov 6, 2013 |
ei arvosteluja | lisää arvostelu
Sinun täytyy kirjautua sisään voidaksesi muokata Yhteistä tietoa
Katso lisäohjeita Common Knowledge -sivuilta (englanniksi).
Teoksen kanoninen nimi
Alkuteoksen nimi
Teoksen muut nimet
Alkuperäinen julkaisuvuosi
Henkilöt/hahmot
Tärkeät paikat
Tärkeät tapahtumat
Kirjaan liittyvät elokuvat
Epigrafi (motto tai mietelause kirjan alussa)
Omistuskirjoitus
Ensimmäiset sanat
Sitaatit
Viimeiset sanat
Erotteluhuomautus
Julkaisutoimittajat
Kirjan kehujat
Alkuteoksen kieli
Kanoninen DDC/MDS
Kanoninen LCC

Viittaukset tähän teokseen muissa lähteissä.

Englanninkielinen Wikipedia

-

Democracy is not naturally plausible. Why turn such important matters over to masses of people who have no expertise? Many theories of democracy answer by appealing to the intrinsic value of democratic procedure, leaving aside whether it makes good decisions. In Democratic Authority, David Estlund offers a groundbreaking alternative based on the idea that democratic authority and legitimacy must depend partly on democracy's tendency to make good decisions. Just as with verdicts in jury trials, Estlund argues, the authority and legitimacy of a political decision does not depend on the particular decision being good or correct. But the "epistemic value" of the procedure--the degree to which it can generally be accepted as tending toward a good decision--is nevertheless crucial. Yet if good decisions were all that mattered, one might wonder why those who know best shouldn't simply rule. Estlund's theory--which he calls "epistemic proceduralism"--avoids epistocracy, or the rule of those who know. He argues that while some few people probably do know best, this can be used in political justification only if their expertise is acceptable from all reasonable points of view. If we seek the best epistemic arrangement in this respect, it will be recognizably democratic--with laws and policies actually authorized by the people subject to them.

Kirjastojen kuvailuja ei löytynyt.

Kirjan kuvailu
Yhteenveto haiku-muodossa

Current Discussions

-

Suosituimmat kansikuvat

Pikalinkit

Arvio (tähdet)

Keskiarvo: (4.5)
0.5
1
1.5
2
2.5
3
3.5
4 1
4.5
5 1

Oletko sinä tämä henkilö?

Tule LibraryThing-kirjailijaksi.

 

Lisätietoja | Ota yhteyttä | LibraryThing.com | Yksityisyyden suoja / Käyttöehdot | Apua/FAQ | Blogi | Kauppa | APIs | TinyCat | Perintökirjastot | Varhaiset kirja-arvostelijat | Yleistieto | 204,381,024 kirjaa! | Yläpalkki: Aina näkyvissä