John Gill’s With Eagles to Glory examines the military fortunes of Napoleon’s German Allies in the 1809 campaign. Out of the wreckage of Austerlitz and Auerstedt, Napoleon had consolidated the German principalities into larger units, chiefly among them the new kings of Bavaria, Saxony, Württemberg and Westphalia (under Napoleon’s brother Jérôme, König Lustig). The kings and dukes were required to provide units for Napoleon’s army. Surprisingly, and in contrast to Wellington, Napoleon kept these small armies together as brigade, division and corps-sized elements with a dual command organization: a nominal French commander giving orders to a German general in charge of the sub-units. They covered Napoleon’s supply lines and flanks. The German units fought surprisingly well. In battle, they plunged in fervently against the Austrian opponents despite the fact that they spoke a common language. Even the Saxons, whose performance at Wagram has given them a bad reputation, were quite good. Gill’s book was written too early for the recent re-analysis of the Saxon contribution in that battle, so he is only correcting the majority view of the bad performance of the Saxons at the margin. In fact, it was bad generalship that sent the Saxons into the Sachsenklemme, a position that no body of troops could have held (especially as they were also fired upon from the rear by their own troops). So Napoleon’s German Allies were truly exceptional to the general rule that politically supplied Allied soldiers usually performed worse than the main national contingent.

Given that the Rheinbund’s territory was nearly equal to NATO’s West Germany (only Saxony being part of East Germany), the study can be read as a reassurance that the German soldiers would fight well alongside the Americans if properly equipped, trained and led. What the study misses is that the Habsburgs had, for centuries, had to rely on the often reluctant troops of these principalities, piecing together companies and regiments. Thus, Napoleon could perfect a system already in place, consolidating their efforts at a more efficient scale.

The book also examines the Bavarian campaign in Tirol, an unnecessary campaign that resulted out of Bavarian incompetence in integrating Tirol into the culturally similar Bavarian kingdom. The early Tyrolean successes were due to the difficult terrain and the absence of the best Bavarian forces which were fighting the Austrian main army with Napoleon. After the defeat of the Habsburgs, the Tyroleans could not resist the full Bavarian army (supported by the French – an inversion of the overall structure).

Overall, a very good read that, however, requires good basic knowledge about the Napoleonic Wars, German geography and the 1809 campaign. I’d recommend reading a shorter introduction to the 1809 campaign (e.g. Chandler), then this book and finally Gill’s monumental three volume strategic history of the 1809 campaign. ( )