KotiRyhmätKeskusteluLisääAjan henki
Etsi sivustolta
Tämä sivusto käyttää evästeitä palvelujen toimittamiseen, toiminnan parantamiseen, analytiikkaan ja (jos et ole kirjautunut sisään) mainostamiseen. Käyttämällä LibraryThingiä ilmaiset, että olet lukenut ja ymmärtänyt käyttöehdot ja yksityisyydensuojakäytännöt. Sivujen ja palveluiden käytön tulee olla näiden ehtojen ja käytäntöjen mukaista.
Hide this

Tulokset Google Booksista

Pikkukuvaa napsauttamalla pääset Google Booksiin.

Why We're Polarized – tekijä: Ezra Klein
Ladataan...

Why We're Polarized (vuoden 2020 painos)

– tekijä: Ezra Klein (Tekijä)

JäseniäKirja-arvostelujaSuosituimmuussijaKeskimääräinen arvioMaininnat
270876,650 (4.33)6
The New York Times Bestseller The Wall Street Journal Bestseller "Few books are as well-matched to the moment of their publication as Ezra Klein's Why We're Polarized." --Dan Hopkins, The Washington Post "It is likely to become the political book of the year....Powerful [and] intelligent." --Fareed Zakaria, CNN "Superbly researched and written..." --Francis Fukuyama, The Washington Post America's political system isn't broken. The truth is scarier: it's working exactly as designed. In this book, journalist Ezra Klein reveals how that system is polarizing us--and how we are polarizing it--with disastrous results. "The American political system--which includes everyone from voters to journalists to the president--is full of rational actors making rational decisions given the incentives they face," writes political analyst Ezra Klein. "We are a collection of functional parts whose efforts combine into a dysfunctional whole." In Why We're Polarized, Klein reveals the structural and psychological forces behind America's descent into division and dysfunction. Neither a polemic nor a lament, this book offers a clear framework for understanding everything from Trump's rise to the Democratic Party's leftward shift to the politicization of everyday culture. America is polarized, first and foremost, by identity. Everyone engaged in American politics is engaged, at some level, in identity politics. Over the past fifty years in America, our partisan identities have merged with our racial, religious, geographic, ideological, and cultural identities. These merged identities have attained a weight that is breaking much in our politics and tearing at the bonds that hold this country together. Klein shows how and why American politics polarized around identity in the twentieth century, and what that polarization did to the way we see the world and one another. And he traces the feedback loops between polarized political identities and polarized political institutions that are driving our system toward crisis. This is a revelatory book that will change how you look at politics, and perhaps at yourself.… (lisätietoja)
Jäsen:benpreis
Teoksen nimi:Why We're Polarized
Kirjailijat:Ezra Klein (Tekijä)
Info:Avid Reader Press / Simon & Schuster (2020), Edition: Illustrated, 336 pages
Kokoelmat:DC
Arvio (tähdet):
Avainsanoja:-

Teoksen tarkat tiedot

Why We're Polarized (tekijä: Ezra Klein (Author))

-
Ladataan...

Kirjaudu LibraryThingiin, niin näet, pidätkö tästä kirjasta vai et.

Ei tämänhetkisiä Keskustelu-viestiketjuja tästä kirjasta.

» Katso myös 6 mainintaa

Näyttää 1-5 (yhteensä 8) (seuraava | näytä kaikki)
Watching the U.S. Capitol being under siege on January 6, 2021 by supporters of the outgoing President points out just how polarized our Country has become. Disputing election results is something which I think of as occurring in third world countries or emerging democracies, but not in modern, established democracies. The peaceful turnover of the Presidency had been, until this week, a hallmark of U.S. elections.

This recent election, and the fight to overturn the results got me wondering when and how did the United States become so politically polarized? Why does half the country believe that president-elect Biden won the election, and the other half remain convinced that the election was stolen from President Trump?

I recently found three books written in the past couple of years which look at how and when the U.S. became so polarized. One book was Ezra Klein's book "Why We're Polarized"; another was "The Red and the Blue: The 1990s and the Birth of Political Tribalism", by Steve Kornacki; and a third was Republican Senator Ben Sasse's book "Them: Why We Hate Each Other - and How to Heal".

Each looked at the question and causes of our current polarization, and each had a somewhat different take on the question. Kornacki looked at the influence Speaker of the House Newt Gingrich had on polarization in Congress starting around the 1990s. Ezra Klein took a broader view, pointing out how the abandonment of the Democratic party for the G.O.P. by the Dixiecrats after Civil Rights legislation was passed allowed the two political parties to better align ideologically. And Senator Sasse looks beyond one man or one group of politicians, and takes the broadest view, examining how society has changed in the past 50 years. In his view, we've become more isolated, more captive to social media and cable news, all of which is making voters more blind to similarities among friends, neighbors, and fellow Americans. I don't think any book totally answered the question conclusively, but each contains insights which helped me gain a better understanding of the issues. Unfortunately, none gave me the feeling that polarization will diminish or politics will be getting less combative in the short term.

I initially considered trying to discuss all three books together, but because of the length that would take, I felt it was necessary to look at each one at a time. In Ezra Klein's book "Why We're Polarized", he examines how Democrats became liberals, and how Republicans became conservatives. Klein's focus is mostly about the abandonment of the Democratic Party by the Southern Dixicrats in the mid 1960s, and their shift to the Republican party. Following that shift, conservative beliefs and liberal beliefs started to better align within the Parties.

He reminds us that Democrats and Republicans may have been at odds against each other for generations, but not to the extent that they are today. The major political parties were not as politically divided in ideology fifty or sixty years ago. In 1950, the American Political Science Association (APSA) had a committee on political parties which issued a report titled "Toward a More Responsible Two-Party System". In it, they pleaded for a more polarized political system. It lamented the fact that the two parties were too similar, and worked too well together. Voters were left confused as to who to vote for, and why. The report stated that "Unless the parties identify themselves with programs, the public is unable to make an intelligent choice between them". Parties were blurred. Each party had a mix of liberals and conservatives. For example, in 1954, Hubert Humphrey, one of the most liberal senators in Congress, was on the Democratic ticket in Minnesota, while the Democratic party ticket in South Carolina had Strom Thurmond, one of the most Conservatives members in Congress. Both were Democrats, but with totally different political philosophies. Republican choices could be just as different. Since both parties supported conservative views as well as liberal views, compromise within each party, and with the opposing party, was the only way things got done.

Additionally, State parties might organize around ideas not supported by National Party platforms. They were largely independent of each other and without a common strategy. There was no national viewpoint on major issues. No single race or economic interest or religion was predominant within one or the other party. As a result, any post-election change from one party to the other party usually resulted in a continuity of action and policies of the nation as a whole on most fundamental issues.

The idea proposed by APSA of moving toward a more polarized system of parties was not readily accepted. In 1959, then VP Richard Nixon, who would go on to create the EPA, OSHA, pass Clean Air and Water Acts, etc., and who would consider a basic minimum income and a universal health care more ambitious than ObamaCare, spoke with derision of those who wanted to partition the political parties by their beliefs. He said it would be a great tragedy if we had our two political parties divide on what we would call conservative and liberal lines. He felt that the strength of the American political system was that we've avoided generally violent swings in Administrations from one extreme to the other. And the reason was because there was room in both parties for a broad spectrum of thought and opinions. Many Democrats, including Robert Kennedy among other, agreed.

Kline goes on to describe politics at that time as being set up to calm our divisions, not represent them. Differences were settled by compromise within each party. National unity would be weakened if ideological differences were sharpened. When a difference existed within a party, it got resolved through suppression or compromise. Parties didn't want to fight among themselves. But that began to change after the 1960s.

Barry Goldwater was a Republican Party presidential candidate in 1964. In campaign speeches, Goldwater wanted to offer a clear choice to the country, not be an echo of other opinions. Moderate Republican Gov. George Romney of Michigan (and father of Mitt Romney) however, disagreed with Goldwater. Romney felt that dogmatic ideological parties tend to splinter the political and social fabric of a nation, leading to government crises which would stymie the compromises so necessary to preserve freedom and achieve progress. But Goldwater and his ideas prevailed, and he won the Republican nomination for president in 1964. However his loss to Lyndon Johnson delayed Goldwater's beliefs from becoming mainstream, and allowed the political wisdom of the age, (i.e., ideologues lose elections), to remain in place for another decade.

Ideological differences between the parties were still somewhat blurred when Gerald Ford ran against Jimmy Carter for President in 1976. Kline noted that in that year, only 54% of the electorate believed that the Republican Party was more conservative than the Democratic party. Almost 30% said there was NO ideological difference at all between the two parties. That's far from beliefs today.

Why did voters become so much more partisan after the 1970s? Kline makes the case that it wasn't because of policy. Both Reagan and George H.W. Bush signed legislation raising taxes. That's a near impossibility in today's Republican Party. Bush signed the American With Disabilities Act and also oversaw a Cap and Trade program to limit sulphur emissions which caused acid rain. Control of atmospheric emissions such as carbon dioxide and methane will not be considered by Republicans today. And Reagan signed off on the Montreal protocols, limiting chlorofluorocarbons (CFCs) to prevent further thinning of the Earth's protective ozone layer. Reagan also signed an immigration reform bill which today's Democrats love and Republicans denounce. Reagan said he believed in the idea of amnesty for those who have put down roots and who have lived here, even if sometimes they may have entered the Country illegally. That's not accepted by the G.O.P. today. And Clinton entered his presidency with a plan to reduce the budget deficit and reform welfare, and in his second term proudly declared the era of big government is over.

So what changed? One thing Kline points out was a shift among Southern Democrats. These "Dixiecrats" were a force unto themselves. They were united for white supremacy and segregation. They objected to Truman's desegregation of the Armed Forces after WWII, and South Carolina Dixicrat Senator Strom Thurmond, still a Democrat at the time, ran against Truman as a third-party States Rights candidate for President in 1948. At the time, voter suppression of Blacks in the South was prevalent, a policy supported by the Dixiecrats.

Subsequently, when Lyndon Johnson won the Presidential election in 1964 over Conservative GOP candidate Barry Goldwater, the Civil Rights Act of 1964 was passed. The bill was opposed by then GOP leader Barry Goldwater, the door was opened for Dixiecrats to abandon the Democratic Party and join the Republicans. That shift subsequently led the parties to sort themselves ideologically. Racial conservatives clustered in the GOP, and racial liberals clustered in the Democratic party. Now each party became more polarized, such that today, no Democrat in Congress is more conservative than any Republican in Congress, and no Republican in Congress is more liberal than any Democrat in Congress. And with that essential arrangement in place, the parties sorted themselves around other issues as well. Parties now are polarized over race, geography, and religion to a large extent.

The rage expressed today between neighbors depending upon which political party they belong to was uncommon before this sorting of Party based on ideology. Back then, it used to be common for voters to split their ticket during elections. And if you were a ticket splitter, and you knew others were ticket splitters, it was hard to get upset with your neighbor based simply on support for one political party or the other.

Once organized as "we" and "they", nature takes over. Polarization creates more polarization. When it's "us" vs. "them", we jealously guard our group and hate the other. On the other hand, people are not as argumentative over issues when differences arise within the group identity. As an example, when Beto O'Rourke ran against Ted Cruz in the Texas Senate race, he raised more money than any other candidate. He became a national sensation among Democrats when running against one of the "other" group. However, his apparent support didn't transfer when he became a Democratic candidate for president. In the presidential primaries, he was running as one of "us" against others in same Democratic Party. The hate of the "other" wasn't there, and his collapse was rapid.

Kline notes that as polarization became more commonplace, signing on to the other party's bills, and explaining how your changes improved the bill, only plays into the other party's success strategy. A party in the minority, working with the other party, makes it harder to win back the majority. Governing and campaigning is now defined by conflict. Once a party determines that the path to governing is to take control, not to work with the other, things transform. Kline explains that instead of developing a good relationship with those on the other side of the aisle, you need to destroy them and make the voters want to destroy them too. Dick Cheney said in 1985, "... confrontation fits our strategy. Polarization often has very beneficial results. If everything is handled through compromise and conciliation, there are no real issues dividing us (G.O.P.) from the Democrats, so why should the voters want to see us in the majority".

Polarization is now ingrained in politicians as well as in the voters. Will Biden's election, being more centered than Trump, be a solution to further polarization? Probably not. As Democrats prepare to take over the White House in 2021, president-elect Biden told Time magazine, “I think you’re gonna see a lot more cooperation than anybody thinks.” However, according to a Dec. 17, 2020 Huffington Post survey, voters are less convinced. Just 13% believed it was realistic to expect a workable bipartisan approach in the next several years, and about two-thirds think it's unrealistic. The survey asked likely voters whether their own party’s representatives should stick to their positions even if it means nothing gets done, or if the representatives should compromise with the other side. Republicans said, by 54 to 25 percent, that they should stick to their positions. Democrats were a little more willing to accept compromise, 43 to 33 percent.

This makes governing all the more difficult. In a recent Foreign Policy article, Carlo Invernizzi Accetti predicts "the United States is likely to be governed by a form of residual centrism defined primarily by opposition to the far-left and the far-right — perpetually kicking the can down the road and maintaining a veneer of stability while social dissatisfaction continues to brew beneath the surface." Not a promising hope for the future.

So Ezra Klein's book gives a thorough description of the way Congress evolved toward it's polarized status today. But as mentioned above, Steve Kornacki's book "The Red and the Blue: The 1990s and the Birth of Political Tribalism", and Nebraska Senator Ben Sasse's book "Them: Why We Hate Each Other - and How to Heal" also examine the same topic. Both offer different takes on answering the question about today's polarization, and are well worth examining. ( )
  rsutto22 | Jul 15, 2021 |
Sometimes fascinating. Sometimes maddening. ( )
  joyblue | Jan 3, 2021 |
I find most political theory books to be fairly forgettable, full of just-so stories. It seems too easy to explain the past, picking and choosing from polls and statistics to make your points. Still, the first few chapters of this book were surprisingly good. But by chapter 5 or 6, about halfway through, the story loses momentum. Klein is a little bit too eager to explain things with unconvincing and probably irreproducible social science experiments, and the shtick gets old. The conclusion chapter, on "fixes," is just awful and poorly thought out, as Klein himself admits.

> Over the past fifty years, our partisan identities have merged with our racial, religious, geographic, ideological, and cultural identities. Those merged identities have attained a weight that is breaking our institutions and tearing at the bonds that hold this country together.

> political scientist and statistician Andrew Gelman and business and strategy professor Pierre-Antoine Kremp find that "per voter, whites have 16 percent more power than blacks once the Electoral College is taken into consideration, 28 percent more power than Latinos

> The state parties were organizing politics around lines the national parties were erasing. "The national and state party organizations are largely independent of one another, each operating within its own sphere, without appreciable common approach to problems of party policy and strategy," complained the authors. The US Congress included Democrats more conservative than many Republicans and Republicans as liberal as the most left-leaning Democrats. They were robbing voters of their most valuable opportunity to influence the course of public affairs.

> Dewey thought this a great strength, since "no single religion or color or race or economic interest is confined to one or the other of our parties. Each party is to some extent a reflection of the other.… This is perhaps part of the secret of our enormous power, that a change from one party to the other has usually involved a continuity of action and policy of the nation as a whole on most fundamentals."

> "With both parties including liberals and conservatives within their ranks," he said, "those differences which would otherwise be the main campaign issues are settled by compromise within each party." He warned that "our national unity would be weakened if the theoretical differences were sharpened."

> Goldwater's electoral destruction entrenched the conventional wisdom of the age: ideologues lost elections

> when Gerald Ford ran against Jimmy Carter, only 54 percent of the electorate believed the Republican Party was more conservative than the Democratic Party. Almost 30 percent said there was no ideological difference at all between the two parties

> Looking at districts with contested House races, they found that between 1972 and 1980, the correlation between the Democratic share of the House vote and the Democratic share of the presidential vote was .54. Between 1982 and 1990, that rose to .65. By 2018, it had reached .97!

> between 2000 and 2004, self-proclaimed independents were more stable in which party they supported than self-proclaimed strong partisans were from 1972 to 1976. 13 I want to say that again: today's independents vote more predictably for one party over the other than yesteryear's partisans.

> the southern Democratic Party was an authoritarian institution that ruled autocratically in the South and that protected its autonomy by entering into a governing coalition with the national Democratic Party. The Dixiecrats gave the national Democrats the votes they needed to control Congress, and the national Democrats let the Dixiecrats enforce segregation and one-party rule at home. The Dixiecrat-Democrat pact is a powerful reminder that there are worse things than polarization, that what's now remembered as a golden age in American politics was purchased at a terrible cost.

> They chose to snap their alliance with the Dixiecrats to pursue justice. Bill Moyers, who served as special assistant to Johnson, recalls finding the president brooding in his bedroom the night he signed the Civil Rights Act. "I think we just delivered the South to the Republican Party for a long time to come,"

> why didn't Republicans become the party of civil rights? Largely, Kabaservice argues, because of Goldwater: "The credit—even the glory—that the Republican Party should have enjoyed for its support for the Civil Rights Act of 1964 was effectively negated when its presumptive presidential nominee voted against the measure." And sure enough, Goldwater's stance against civil rights paid dividends. His disastrous presidential campaign succeeded in only one region of the country: the old Confederacy, which realized that the language of small government conservatism could be weaponized against the federal government's efforts to right America's racial wrongs.

> It is not that American politics was not riven by sharp, even violent disagreement in this era; it's simply that these fights did not map cleanly onto party. It couldn't last, and it didn't. The Democratic Party's embrace of civil rights, and the Republican Party's decision to unite behind a standard-bearer who opposed the bill, cleared the way for southern conservatives to join the Republican Party.

> the mid-twentieth century was not an era in which the world outside Washington was either serene or moderate. This was the age of Joseph McCarthy, the Vietnam War, and the draft dodger. It was a time of political assassinations, of civil rights activists being beaten on bridges, of authoritarian rule in the South, of feminists marching in the streets and Native Americans occupying Alcatraz. The irony is that the American political system was most calm and least polarized when America itself seemed to be on the verge of cracking apart.

> When polarization is driven by allegiance to political parties, it can be moderating. Political parties want to win elections, so they try to champion ideas that won't get their candidates crushed at the ballot box. People who aren't attached to one party or the other are free to hold much more unpopular opinions.

> From 1972 to 1984, the average difference between how a state voted in one presidential election and how it voted in the next was 7.7 percentage points. From 2000 to 2012, it was only 1.9 percentage points

> People with what we call a fixed worldview are more fearful of potential dangers, and are likely to prefer clear and unwavering rules to help them navigate all the threats. This mind-set leads them to support social structures in which hierarchy and order prevail, the better to ensure people don't stray too far from the straight and narrow. By contrast, people with what we call a fluid worldview are less likely to perceive the world as dangerous. By extension, they will endorse social structures that allow individuals to find their own way in life

> psychology doesn't predict political opinions among people who don't pay much attention to politics, but it's a powerful predictor of political opinions among those who do.

> We understand reasoning to be an individual act. This is, in many cases, wrong. "The central flaw in the concept of reason that animated the eighteenth-century Enlightenment is that it is entirely individualistic," writes philosopher Joseph Heath. But decades of research has proven that "reason is both decentralized and dispersed across multiple individuals. It is not possible to be rational all by yourself; rationality is inherently a collective project."

> After being exposed to the Spanish speakers on their metro lines for just three days, attitudes on these questions moved sharply rightward: The mostly liberal Democratic passengers had come to endorse immigration policies—including deportation of children of undocumented immigrants—similar to those endorsed by Trump in his campaign.

> For two hundred years, whites in America represented an undisputed politically, economically, and culturally dominant majority. When a political tribe is so overwhelmingly dominant, it can persecute with impunity, but it can also be more generous.

> between 1997 and 2007 with those that didn't. "The increase in polarization was nearly three times as large in the 28 chambers that limited party contributions as it was in the 8 chambers that allowed for unlimited contributions,"

> conservatism isn't, for most people, an ideology. It's a group identity. ( )
  breic | Dec 27, 2020 |
Lots of valuable insights and analysis into the concept of polarization, both historical and of recent vintage. Understanding how our current politics came about is quite the interesting journey, even if the resulting history, and the consequences for our futures, is not terribly inspiring. A solid piece of reporting and analysis. ( )
  RandyRasa | Dec 3, 2020 |
This is one depressing book. The first part of the book shows that the election of trump is not that different from any other election, which kind of startled me since it seems that trump's election could be the beginning of the end of democracy. Klein's information about our proclivity towards partisanship amazed me. I'm always confused at the need to depict some people as the other, and I appreciated the studies he highlighted. He at last shows the extreme partisanship that makes our breaking government different from governments in the past, and at last he gives recommendations. Alas, all the hope he shows through his recommendations is negated by the fact that I can see no way to achieve them in this age of extreme partisanship. One thing we can do is pay more attention to local politics. That's the only small bit of hope I could garner from his ideas. ( )
  Citizenjoyce | Sep 7, 2020 |
Näyttää 1-5 (yhteensä 8) (seuraava | näytä kaikki)
ei arvosteluja | lisää arvostelu
Sinun täytyy kirjautua sisään voidaksesi muokata Yhteistä tietoa
Katso lisäohjeita Common Knowledge -sivuilta (englanniksi).
Kanoninen teoksen nimi
Tiedot englanninkielisestä Yhteisestä tiedosta. Muokkaa kotoistaaksesi se omalle kielellesi.
Alkuteoksen nimi
Teoksen muut nimet
Alkuperäinen julkaisuvuosi
Henkilöt/hahmot
Tärkeät paikat
Tärkeät tapahtumat
Kirjaan liittyvät elokuvat
Palkinnot ja kunnianosoitukset
Tiedot venäjänkielisestä Yhteisestä tiedosta. Muokkaa kotoistaaksesi se omalle kielellesi.
Epigrafi (motto tai mietelause kirjan alussa)
Omistuskirjoitus
Ensimmäiset sanat
Sitaatit
Viimeiset sanat
Erotteluhuomautus
Julkaisutoimittajat
Kirjan kehujat
Alkuteoksen kieli
Kanoninen DDC/MDS
Kanoninen LCC

Viittaukset tähän teokseen muissa lähteissä.

Englanninkielinen Wikipedia

-

The New York Times Bestseller The Wall Street Journal Bestseller "Few books are as well-matched to the moment of their publication as Ezra Klein's Why We're Polarized." --Dan Hopkins, The Washington Post "It is likely to become the political book of the year....Powerful [and] intelligent." --Fareed Zakaria, CNN "Superbly researched and written..." --Francis Fukuyama, The Washington Post America's political system isn't broken. The truth is scarier: it's working exactly as designed. In this book, journalist Ezra Klein reveals how that system is polarizing us--and how we are polarizing it--with disastrous results. "The American political system--which includes everyone from voters to journalists to the president--is full of rational actors making rational decisions given the incentives they face," writes political analyst Ezra Klein. "We are a collection of functional parts whose efforts combine into a dysfunctional whole." In Why We're Polarized, Klein reveals the structural and psychological forces behind America's descent into division and dysfunction. Neither a polemic nor a lament, this book offers a clear framework for understanding everything from Trump's rise to the Democratic Party's leftward shift to the politicization of everyday culture. America is polarized, first and foremost, by identity. Everyone engaged in American politics is engaged, at some level, in identity politics. Over the past fifty years in America, our partisan identities have merged with our racial, religious, geographic, ideological, and cultural identities. These merged identities have attained a weight that is breaking much in our politics and tearing at the bonds that hold this country together. Klein shows how and why American politics polarized around identity in the twentieth century, and what that polarization did to the way we see the world and one another. And he traces the feedback loops between polarized political identities and polarized political institutions that are driving our system toward crisis. This is a revelatory book that will change how you look at politics, and perhaps at yourself.

Kirjastojen kuvailuja ei löytynyt.

Kirjan kuvailu
Yhteenveto haiku-muodossa

Suosituimmat kansikuvat

Pikalinkit

Arvio (tähdet)

Keskiarvo: (4.33)
0.5
1
1.5
2
2.5
3 3
3.5 3
4 20
4.5 2
5 19

Oletko sinä tämä henkilö?

Tule LibraryThing-kirjailijaksi.

 

Lisätietoja | Ota yhteyttä | LibraryThing.com | Yksityisyyden suoja / Käyttöehdot | Apua/FAQ | Blogi | Kauppa | APIs | TinyCat | Perintökirjastot | Varhaiset kirja-arvostelijat | Yleistieto | 162,137,986 kirjaa! | Yläpalkki: Aina näkyvissä