Excellent book on development of tank/armor doctrine in Germany and Soviet Union between two world wars.

In a very interesting way author shows how German and USSR approaches to armor doctrine and warfare had a lot of similarities (and in some places they even came to exactly same conclusions) but that path was not just copying from each other.

Story is broken into several time periods:
- Immediately after WW1 tank was identified as important weapon but not the decisive one. At this point both Germany and USSR weren't that confident about utilization of tanks. It was felt that technology needs to be further refined - at that point infantry, cavalry and artillery were to remain backbone of the army (air force being the more promising new addition).
- Period betwen 1923 and 1927 where there was a discussion about technology vs men and impacts mechanization would have on society (especially when talking about JC Fuller's fully mechanized army approach). Again, proponents of infantry as a main force were the most influental, but slowly, technological progress with tank development started to show its advantages. Tanks are no more cumbersome war machines slowly crawling across the battlefield. Now they have the speed and firepower to make them self sustainable and capable of operating behind enemy lines. This is part when USSR industrialization starts to kick in, and USSR defence industry starts to be built.
- Period between 1927 and 1933 is period where Germany and USSR secretly joined forces to further experiment the future wars tactics, doctrine and new weapons - amongst them tank in dedicated joint tank school in Kazan. Two countries had different aims: Germany was not allowed to have tanks nor to experiment in any way with advanced weaponry, so ability to do that in USSR was great opportunity; USSR was kickstarting its industry and they needed blueprints, and experiences (tactical and technological) from German side. This brought like-minded people together from both sides and basic principles on how to use new mechanized armies started to crystalize.
- Period from 1933 to beginning of Spanish Civil War. Joint ventures are no more due to political differences. Germany is on fast track to develop its own approach to war and expand the army (following Hitler's great support and plans for war in Europe) while USSR now has good industrial basis and their own approach to mechanized warfare. Both sides are struggling to put their ideas into implementation, partly because of the technological issues (cumbersome radio equipment for example and lack of mechanization to transport infantry at the same speed as advancing tanks) and partly because nobody is completely sure how one is supposed to translate the details of new way of war into actual manouvers in the field.
- Period from 1936 'til 1939 - Spain (like Ukraine today) is treated as large laboratory for testing new approaches to warfighting. Germany and USSR both participate by providing materiel and personnel but they end up with different conclusions - while Germans state that Spain is not a true blueprint of the new war because of the specifics of it, USSR is more worried and no longer sees deep battle approach as feasible. This coupled with Stalin's purge of military (especially high technology parts of it, like mechanized/tank troops) will slow down the further development in USSR. This will have grave consequences at the beginning when Germany decides to invade, but teachings and lessons of deep battle learned up to that point (together with tehnological elements and military industry built in previous years) will prove deadly in the hands of future USSR officers (Zhukov predominently, especially after his experiences in Far East in 1939 against Japanese) and will seal the fate of Hitler's Germany.

Author shows that while there was definitely exchange of ideas between officers and troops, especially in Kazan, both armies have come to the very similar approaches and in some fields same conclusions almost indenpendently. Germany never managed to reach level of military production as was case in USSR while USSR did not have same level of tactical/practical experience as German have. But they both came to same conclusions.

Reason for this was presence of people not afraid to think outside the norms on both German and USSR side. It is very interesting to see how approaches in the two armies greatly differed - in USSR Thukhachevsky was pushing the envelope almost on a daily basis, constantly pushing for establishment of military industry that will be able to serve the Red Army with all the war machines required. He was aware that without industrial base and not becoming self sustainable, Red Army would never progress. While his requirements seemed almost like science fiction at times, industry took it as a challenge and established itself with time as capable to provide what is needed. On the other hand Germany was trying to first figure out how to use the tank before pushing its own industry to actually build them. What both armies agreed upon was that forces required had to be substantial. Additionally logistics had to be substantial and efficient otherwise all the mechanization effort was doomed to failure. Again, Fuller's and Liddell Hart's concepts of small armies were proven false - even to exploit the breakthrough, advancing army required reserves to push the advance - if for no other reason than to have fresh forces available to make the further advances (since shock/strike elements would be exhausted in opening the break point).

What is important to note (as author says) is that while all these exceptional thinkers are always the pivot point, tip of the spear, no new approach would or will be accepted until General HQ agrees with it. And people from both armies very high in respective General HQs were people that did majority of work when it comes to inclusion of new technologies and combat doctrines. It is very interesting how Guderian himself got included relatively late but managed to capitalize greatly on the work of his predecessors (Beck especially) once mechanized/tank troops became more or less established (1933 onwards).

It is important to keep in mind that both armies were always following the military trends, especially those from UK and France (countries that were trend-setters when it came to mechanized/tank warfare, although they themselves weren't that confident in tank as a new capable weapon). Officers from both armies read and translated the books, treaties and training manuals but always aimed not just to copy but to apply what they learned to their own circumstances. Also they were able to purchase technology from west (again, mostly from UK and USA) - while in early 1920s USSR was isolated, in mid-20's it was possible for USSR to purchase sample tanks, designs and even contract the designers from the West. This allowed USSR to build their own solutions on the basis of already proven concepts. Germans would follow (technologically) same approach but at the more modest scale after Hitler's government challenged and later completely disregarded decisions of WW1 peace accords.

Excellent book, with quite a food for thought and lessons applicable even in modern times. As author says in order to judge the applicability of the new weapons and doctrines, theories and manouvers are not sufficient - unfortunately, war is the only place where final judgement on weapon/doctrine fitness is made.

Highly recommended. ( )

The book is well written and argumented; a "must read" for anyone interested in the interwar history of the USSR and Germany.

What's surprised me, though, is the vitality of the myth of the so called Tukhachevskii's "military genius." This legend is based solely on a fallacy: Stalin was bad; Stalin killed Tukhachevskii; ergo, Tukhachevskii was good. The only military operations successfully conducted by Tukhachevskii were against the anti-Bolsheviks revolt in the Tambov district, when this "genius" used hostage-taking "tactics" and chemical weapons against the insurgents, i.e. Russian peasants.

A remarkable detail: among different reasons for the Red Army's defeats in 1941, the author DOES NOT mention "obsolete" tanks. "Obsolete" Red Army tanks is just another popular myth, originated in Glavpur (Chief Political Directorate of the Soviet Army), and being disseminated still by the History Channel.

What I've been having a problem with, are the countless errors in the transliterated titles of Russian books and archived documents. What was the point of the transliteration, anyway? For those who read Russian, Cyrillic letters would do just as well; for those who do not, it doesn't matter. I don't believe that Cornell University Press has no Cyrillic typefaces at its disposal. Furthermore, it's comparatively easy to find a Russian-speaking proofreader in the United States—not to mention an English-speaking proofreader who might do a much better job on this book. ( )

This monograph bears close study in that the author puts a lot of meat on the bones of the history of the mechanization of warfare by the leading practitioners. If nothing else Habeck spent a lot of time in Russian archives, and it shows in the depth that she is able to go to in documenting the cut and thrust of debate in the Red Army. Besides that, there are enough asides to get the flavor of how the debators in the German and Russian militaries were affected by the social and political currents of their own societies. Certainly a must work for anyone who is really interested in the history of armored warfare, or the dynamics of doctrinal and technological revolution in military affairs. ( )