Tämä sivusto käyttää evästeitä palvelujen toimittamiseen, toiminnan parantamiseen, analytiikkaan ja (jos et ole kirjautunut sisään) mainostamiseen. Käyttämällä LibraryThingiä ilmaiset, että olet lukenut ja ymmärtänyt käyttöehdot ja yksityisyydensuojakäytännöt. Sivujen ja palveluiden käytön tulee olla näiden ehtojen ja käytäntöjen mukaista.
In this masterly study of 1815, Peter Hofschroer challenges the accepted version of events at the battle of Waterloo. He demonstrates convincingly that Allied victory hinged on the contribution of German soldiers. In this masterly study of 1815, Peter Hofschroer challenges the accepted version of events at the battle of Waterloo. He demonstrates convincingly that Allied victory hinged on the contribution of German soldiers. Drawing on previously unpublished accounts, Hofschroer gives not only the Prussian perspective of their march to Waterloo and decisive attack on Napoleon's flank, but also details of the actions fought by some of the 25,000 Germans in Wellington's µBritish' army v more than a third of the Duke's force. A gripping narrative of astonishing detail captures such key episodes of Waterloo as La Haye Sainte, Papelotte, Hougoumont and the Prussian struggle with the Imperial Guard for Plancenoit. In addition, Hofschr#152;er examines the battle at Wavre, the Allied offensive into France, the taking of Paris and the sieges across northern France.… (lisätietoja)
This book is the second book by this author on the Waterloo campaign. It begins on the end of the battle of Ligny, Dawn June 17th, 1815and carries matters up to the Surrender of the new French Government to the Allied armies in August of 1815. It is very well footnoted as the author is marshalling evidence about the errors and omissions in the Duke of Wellington's two published acounts of Waterloo. It seems there is good evidence that matters were more fondly remembered by the Duke andby his latter english followers than the published orders and memories of his non-British witnesses relate. The army he commanded was ony one third British, and at least two-thirds of the fighting and the losses were to his Prussian and other German allies. If one wishes an exacting critique of Wellington's stories one should refer to Hofschroer's translation of "On Wellington: A Critique of Waterloo" by Karl von Clausewitz, the Clausewitz who spent the day after Waterloo fighting at Wavre against Grouchy, but has credentials as a man who knew his way around a battlefield. It does appear that Arthur Wellesley did considerable to keep his own reputation, and that of the army he personally led, bright and shiny, rather than sticking too tightly to the picture revealed by his own written orders, and those of his non-Britannic allies. Definitely a book the scrupulous historian should refer to hereafter. ( )
Tiedot englanninkielisestä Yhteisestä tiedosta.Muokkaa kotoistaaksesi se omalle kielellesi.
"The worst behaviour has come from Wellington, who without us would have been smashed to pieces. He did not keep his promises to be prepared to come to our assistance on the 16th [June], but, not considering the defeat he caused, we chivalrously came to his assistance on the 18th. We cleared his way to Paris, for without us, he would not have got there so quickly. We saved him a second battle thanks to our rapid pursuit, for it was we who scattered the enemy, so no Britons needed to fight a battle after the 18th. The man has rewarded our many services with the most contemptuous ingratitude. Letter written by Gneisenau to Ernst Moritz Arndt, Paris. 17 August 1815.
Omistuskirjoitus
Ensimmäiset sanat
Tiedot englanninkielisestä Yhteisestä tiedosta.Muokkaa kotoistaaksesi se omalle kielellesi.
By nightfall on 16 June the Prussian forces had been defeated at Ligny and were retreating northwards in a state of confusion.
Sitaatit
Viimeiset sanat
Tiedot englanninkielisestä Yhteisestä tiedosta.Muokkaa kotoistaaksesi se omalle kielellesi.
To regard the Duke of Wellington, as most British historians have done, as the sole or even prime victor of Waterloo is to fail to consider the factual evidence fully. Waterloo was, in fact, primarily a German victory in which both the British Army and the Duke of Wellington played a secondary, supporting role.
In this masterly study of 1815, Peter Hofschroer challenges the accepted version of events at the battle of Waterloo. He demonstrates convincingly that Allied victory hinged on the contribution of German soldiers. In this masterly study of 1815, Peter Hofschroer challenges the accepted version of events at the battle of Waterloo. He demonstrates convincingly that Allied victory hinged on the contribution of German soldiers. Drawing on previously unpublished accounts, Hofschroer gives not only the Prussian perspective of their march to Waterloo and decisive attack on Napoleon's flank, but also details of the actions fought by some of the 25,000 Germans in Wellington's µBritish' army v more than a third of the Duke's force. A gripping narrative of astonishing detail captures such key episodes of Waterloo as La Haye Sainte, Papelotte, Hougoumont and the Prussian struggle with the Imperial Guard for Plancenoit. In addition, Hofschr#152;er examines the battle at Wavre, the Allied offensive into France, the taking of Paris and the sieges across northern France.
If one wishes an exacting critique of Wellington's stories one should refer to Hofschroer's translation of "On Wellington: A Critique of Waterloo" by Karl von Clausewitz, the Clausewitz who spent the day after Waterloo fighting at Wavre against Grouchy, but has credentials as a man who knew his way around a battlefield.
It does appear that Arthur Wellesley did considerable to keep his own reputation, and that of the army he personally led, bright and shiny, rather than sticking too tightly to the picture revealed by his own written orders, and those of his non-Britannic allies. Definitely a book the scrupulous historian should refer to hereafter. ( )