A book from an expert on China who basically says he (and other China experts) fell for strategic deception by China and thus dramatically underestimated them as a rival and strategic threat. Essentially the argument is that China views the US as "the declining hegemon" and that for China to be successful it must take the place of the US ("no two suns in the sky"), and that the correct strategy is not to focus on military confrontation but rather to build economic and political power to the point that military superiority becomes trivial.

Extensive references to Chinese history and literature, both classical (particularly warring states period) and 1949-today restricted publication Chinese sources.

I'm unclear how valid this really is (maybe he's just trying to be relevant in the modern policy world by taking a newly more popular view...), and also unclear if nation states will continue to be the dominant species over the long time scales, but a 1949 to 2049 century of Chinese development certainly does seem like something worth evaluating. The book inspires me to want to learn more about China, at the very least. ( )

Listened to about 2 hours of this. There are two key problems with the book.

The first is that it seems like almost all of the content depends on just one source, the author. There are a bunch of red flags in the text that point to this, like the conspiratorial language that's used, the author's insistence that other China experts don't understand Chinese nearly as well as he does (and so should be ignored), or claims that others have been successfully 'duped' by China's public statements but that Pillsbury has spoken to former USSR operatives and knows what's really going on. Having a single source doesn't always mean a book is problematic; philosophical or autobiographical texts tend to have this same attribute and can work fine. But when you make a bunch of claims about a nation of over a billion people based on only personal experience and a claimed better understanding of Mandarin, I think it's fair to cry foul.

The second deals with the thesis of the book. Throughout the beginning chapters, Pillsbury keeps talking about how China wants to overtake the US, how they're not OK playing second-fiddle, how China has tried to deceive the US into thinking they don't have world leader ambitions, etc. The language and tone in which the author presents these ideas is meant to evoke fear, concern, and surprise on the side of the reader. But this is totally unsurprising to me: wouldn't it make sense that China intends to be #1, especially when it has the greatest population? Becoming the world's leading power is a very reasonable long-term goal for any nation-state. Pillsbury's presentation is akin a basketball coach telling his players things like "the other team wants to beat us!" and "you don't get it, they want to be the champions, they're not OK taking second place!" I think most people would be confused that the coach would think players need to be reminded of this key attribute of any competition.

Not recommended. ( )

I am impressed how paranoid the author is. It's exactly the kind of paranoia you want from an analyst. What I don't like is the hypocrisy of the west. We complain about China doing all kinds of terrible things and yet claim outrageously that somehow we're not guilty of the same exact thing. When you point it out it's always the same excuse: when we do it, we do it for good reasons. Even more depressing is that this sort of bias is considered patriotic. ( )

A very interesting read from someone who clearly knows his stuff. His main thesis is that America has been fooled by China, who has been on a path to overtake the US since the time of Nixon. And he has convincing insider information from his time as a "spy" to bring to bear. So much so that you become convinced that it may be too late for the US to do anything about it.

But there is something about how he tells his story that makes you think that perhaps he's overcompensating for the times he feels he was duped by China to now thinking China can do no wrong. And then you wonder if perhaps his judgment may be wrong now just as it was wrong before, and perhaps there is hope for the US. I am not convinced that present US leadership has the skills to meet the challenge. But this book has certainly made me rethink what I thought I knew about America's relations with China. ( )

It appears from what the author writes that he is one of very few Americans not raised in the Chinese language who is qualified to have arrived at the conclusions he did. ( )