To cut to the chase, the most generic cross-case explanation for why air forces fail in war is magical thinking. Too many powers bought into the more superficial claims of aviation enthusiasts and convinced themselves that sprinkling aircraft like fairy dust over their strategic problems would make everything better, and would allow them to ignore the hard imperatives of matching means to ends, logistical constraints, and the reality that high-tech weaponry needs deep social and economic foundations to be effective.

As for the specific essays, Rene De La Pedraja on the failures of Argentine combat aviation in the Falklands was possibly the most informative, seeing as he seems to have deeply mined the available analysis from both sides and makes a good argument that the Argentines could have won this war, if only the Galtieri junta had engaged in some hard-headed thinking. I also enjoyed the pieces on Poland, Italy, and Japan for their examination of the doctrinal weaknesses of those countries’ air services, and how this squandered what resources were available. Regretfully, I have to conclude that editor Robin Higham’s own piece on the Arab air arms of the Cold War is probably the single weakest essay, if only because the archival foundations aren’t there to achieve the incisiveness of the other essays in this collection. ( )