William James Philpott

Ágætis yfirlit yfir fyrri heimsstyrjöldina. Philpott einsetur sér að sannfæra lesandann um að flestir hershöfðingjarnir hafi áttað sig tiltölulega snemma á því að stríðið snérist fyrst og fremst um að vinna andstæðinginn með því að eyða getu hans til að endurnýja mannafla og hergögn. Því hafi blóðbaðið í fyrri heimsstyrjöldinni snúist fyrst og fremst um þetta markmið hershöfðingjanna. Sagan er því að hluta til skrifuð sem syndaaflausn fyrir miskunnarleysi herforingjanna sem þótti nokkurra tuga þúsunda mannfall ásættanlegt ef andstæðingurinn varð fyrir álíka mannfalli. Philpott setur ágætlega fram þennan rökstuðning sinn og sameinar heildarmyndina af stríðsrekstrinum með land- og sjóhernaði, pólitík, áróðri og efnahagsuppbyggingu ríkjanna til herrekstursins.… (lisätietoja)

This is a very detailed narrative that covers the military history of WWI from the beginning of the Battle of the Somme. The author's discussion goes through to the end of the war but the emphasis is from July 1, 1916 to the end of 1916. The characterization of the battle as the first battle of the twentieth century is emphasized by the author's constant reference to the battle as the beginning of industrial war.
There is much more to the book than just a description of horrific casualty figures. The author provides a very good analysis of the changes that were brought to the battlefield by the increased industrialization of society. One of the major changes is that WWI is the only war where the majority of casualties were caused by artillery and not guns and bullets.
The author does a good job of explaining how the French beginning with the Battle of Verdun developed tactics that made greater use of artillery on the battlefield. The English had such great casualties on July 1, 1916 because they refused to utilize the knowledge that had been gained by the French. Slowly the English changed their tactics and developed greater manpower resources than the French. This allowed them to take the greater burden of the fight against the Germans.
With the beginning of the Somme the Germans slowly began losing the war. The author provides a good description of the changes in tactics made by Ludendorff in the German offensive of early 1918. However, industrial war became a contest of resources which Germany could not win.
This book introduced new ideas into the discussion of how WWI was fought. It also provided a good narrative of the battlefield action and the personalities of the leading generals. The author's new insights made it a very good book about a conflict that has been overshadowed by the rest of the violence of the twentieth century. I did think it was a bit long but it was never boring.… (lisätietoja)

Essentially asking the rhetorical question that if the Somme was such a waste why was it contested so ferociously. In place of myth, an “unsophisticated parody of the truth,” Philpott wishes to school contemporary audiences about the hard realities of industrial war circa 1916, how a mass battle of attrition would have to be waged at some point, and how the relief of Verdun was that moment. What this work does particularly well is to rise above the horrors of the First of July and to place the campaign back into the context of coalition warfare by dealing with the French role, and what it meant for Germans as marking the stage after which they were never quite the same.

Philpott also provides a thoughtful examination of how the Somme has been recalled over the years, to the point to where it is now beyond memory. Though he would like to see the battle remembered more in terms of grim sacrifice rather than mindless annihilation, Philpott seems to recognize that his contribution is unlikely to make that deep a dent in the popular mindset: “Futility can be refuted, but the slaughter…can never be removed.” This is very much a useful contribution of the study of the Great War.

If I have a complaint with this work it's that Philpott glosses over the Anglo-French traumas of 1917 a little too casually for my taste, seemingly as only a brief detour from the operational learning gained in 1916.… (lisätietoja)