Danny Orbach

This is a great book, and anyone interested in the history of Japan should put it on their reading list. This is a serious academic work, but it is far from boring. Indeed, the amount of cloak-and-dagger material in here is shocking.

Orbach explores the role of the Japanese army in politics and the instability of the Japanese government in the years between the Meiji restoration and the start of WWII, ending this account briefly after the coup attempt of 1936. He identifies a number of “bugs” in the Japanese polity both as it was formally defined in its constitution, and as it worked in practice. The Meiji Constitution was an audacious blend of Japanese tradition and Western constitutional ideas. Japanese politicians in particular took inspiration from Germany, newly unified after the Prusso-French war of 1870 and a power in the ascendance. But it has been said that the constitution that Bismarck created for his new fatherland was one that he alone could make work. Maybe the Japanese made a poor choice in following his lead.

I won’t repeat Orbach’s enumeration here. But the winners of the Boshin War, after overthrowing the Tokugawa shogunate, made decisions that would haunt Japan. One decision was to unify Japan behind the Emperor, an institution which was given a thorough make-over and modernisation to achieve this goal. But this was not done by imposing the will of the emperor on everyone; instead everyone was allowed to state that they followed the will of the emperor, no matter how fiercely they might argue among themselves. While this provided an effective formal focus for national unity, this reverential “agreement to disagree” also offered a built-in justification for rebellion. This was worsened by the second decision the new leaders made, their refusal to give up power. This was understandable, if only for their own safety, but it set a precedent for rebellion being necessary, successful, and rewarded.

Whatever the flaws of the Tokugawa Shogunate, they would probably have been baffled by the attitude that their successors took to rebellions against the government. The coup plotters of 1931, who wanted to use bombardment aircraft to wipe out the entire cabinet, where briefly confined... not to jail, but to a comfortable inn. The staff officers of the Kwantung Army who invaded a country in open defiance of their government successfully escaped punishment, however irate their Emperor might be. The lesson was that a government had no power if enough people refused to obey it.

But personally I suspect that the biggest flaw in the system was rooted deeply in Japanese culture. Going back at least to the Heian period, from the 8th to the 12th century, a separation between the theoretical and actual holders of power was a known pattern in Japanese history. A pattern in which the formal holders of office lived sheltered, ritual and comfortable lives, but real power was wielded by practical men (nearly always men) in back offices. In the early 20th century this had evolved in the devolution of considerable power to relatively junior army officers, whose superiors proved unable to stop them. In a bizarre reversal of military logic, their relatively low position in the army hierarchy had the effect of making them less accountable. In one instance described by Orbach, a prime minister balked at the idea of negotiating with a mere bureau chief in the Army Ministry, but the main effect of this was that the government was unable to control the situation.

Orbach recounts the story of a long series of rebellious events both at home and abroad, including the Satsuma rebellion, the murder of queen Min of Korea, the murder of the Chinese warlord Zhang Zuolin, the invasion of Manchuria, the Taisho crisis of 1912, the attempted coup of the Sakura-Kai in 1931, and the attempted coup of 1936. He recognises that after this, power dynamics changed. Radical nationalism was no longer the province of young officers, whose political activism was effectively repressed in the aftermath of their failure to grab power. Instead, it was incorporated in the power structures at the top of the army, whose leaders were not ashamed to hint that their subordinates might rebel again if the wishes of the army were not granted. It’s a natural end of the book, but you’d wish that Orbach had continued his story right up to December 1941 and beyond.… (lisätietoja)

Very interesting book about some of the members of the Nazi party up to 1980s when majority of "old guard" died out. Focus is on Europe and Middle East and author does not go around the world, especially South America.

Finding themselves at the mercy of the Allies at the end of WW2 in Europe, lots of members of Nazi party that held prominent positions [but did not manage to escape] decided that they have to make themselves useful to new [de facto] rulers, US and Russia.

And so story begins. In the shadow of Red Scare and overestimation (better said over-blowing) of the quality of information and skills of remaining Nazi/SD/GESTAPO/ABWEHR members, they tried to find their niche in order .... well, basically just to survive. And thrived they did - as arms smugglers (having FLN as customers was .... interesting gotta admit, until Action service came in), as weapon designers (missiles for Egypt to be used against Israel) and spies for hire (providing services to anyone who can pay - US, Russians, UK, French, Israelis .... as long as they have money all's good). Highest achievement was of course in Western Germany where lots of these former Nazis found place in state level ministries and especially in Gehlen's organization that with time became Western Germany security service BND. Did this open the soft belly of the W. Germany to Soviet blackmail and infiltration - definitely. Was it unexpected? You gotta be kidding me. if people in profession that is based on blackmail and extortion were surprised by this ...... come on! it was just a lever everyone wanted in place so they can use it for their convenience.

While entire feeling about the book is that this is talk about past, I beg to differ. Riding on the wave of romanticizing German army of WW2 (and all other German services of the same time period) starting from 1950's, propagandists enabled all the hard-core beliefs from the surviving Nazis to transfer to new generations. And this gave birth to not just holocaust denier groups (which is terrible on its own) but to groups of paramilitary organizations throughout the world created with the single purpose - hunting down the Red Scare, no matter the casualties and no matter who is marked as Red Scare. If in doubt just check South America and various dictators and juntas that grew and flourished there starting from 1960's onward, especially among military elite.

It is interesting author never discusses South America and effect Nazis had in those areas. In my opinion this would make the work much more serious because what happened in 20th century, during the Cold War, in S. America was terrible application of Nazi general politics, approaches to forcing people to bend to their will and in general experiences from battlefields of WW2 (especially those connected to counter intelligence and spy/partisan hunting).

Unfortunately Hydra of Nazism is still alive and interestingly enough groups that grow with this highly dangerous ideology are still used as a weapon in deniable operations. With time people got desensitized on the notion of Nazism and Fascism (especially with the total devaluation of the terms themselves because progressives know only to call their opponents Nazis), and this is something that needs to be handled somehow with highest priority and these groups stopped. And I don't mean just fringe groups but paramilitaries and corporate/governmental organizations used as dogs of war and [as history repeats itself] again romanticized as knights on a mission when fighting in [deniable] wars for their [progressive, well they call themselves that] masters who always see themselves as only light on the planet.

For European and Mediterranean area this book is pretty good. For greater picture on these dangerous people on world level it is seriously lacking.

In any case recommended.… (lisätietoja)

Although this monograph is categorized as "military science," it could be just as easily slotted into political science or sociology, as Orbach examines how the congenital issues of the creation of Meiji Japan dogged that society until they helped to induce disaster. These flaws included how the Meiji oligarchs created a governing system where accountability depended on their predominance (and no one really replaced them), how the authority of the imperial throne was more a concept than an operationalized reality, and how a commitment to the expansion of empire as the solution to Japan's domestic issues could never be reexamined after it had ceased to be viable.

Woven through this is the story of the character of the so-called "warriors of high aspirations," young men on the make with high opinions of themselves looking to do well while doing what they considered good. These sorts of men successfully pulled off the Meiji restoration and the success of these rebels remained a shining example to succeeding generations of marginalized junior officers, who were always a potential threat to disrupt affairs, up to the insurrection of 1936, when Hirohito threatened to personally lead the counter-coup if his generals would not suppress their dangerous pets. The revolt was slapped down but by that point the damage was done to normal politics in Japan; not that anyone was really reconsidering the viability of the war with China.

Orbach writes well about these issues and goes to some lengths to illustrate how personal ties in Japan could almost always undermine the links of the formal organization of authority.… (lisätietoja)

You know the saying "The devil takes care of his own"? My deeply Catholic mother reminds me of that one a lot when I complain about the way God arranges things; there is, she says, another power at work in the world as well. Whatever your theological outlook, you have to admit, the history this book discusses feels like proof. I mean, I suppose it's like the thing that circulates now and then about Lincoln having a secretary named Kennedy and Kennedy having a secretary named Lincoln, etc; probably any world leader has, knowingly or not, dodged an assassination attempt or three through sheer luck.

But I don't think it can be denied that at the very least Hitler was a lucky bastard. He ascribed it to divine protection. I certainly hope not. He is a major argument for me against predestination – because if it turns out that Hitler was in some way kept alive in order to create all the circumstances that surrounded him, for the people who died to die and for those who lived to live … I am going to complain to the management. Loudly.

The seeds of the war were something I didn't know as much about as I thought. I've never known much about Neville Chamberlain; I know a bit about the War, not so much about the buildup. I knew enough to associate him with appeasement. I didn't expect to simultaneously sympathize with and revile him. I'm always left baffled by the kind of mindset which wants to rule the world – I wouldn't take it if you handed it to me on a tea tray covered in chocolate. (I say things like "When I am queen, I will change the name of 'common sense', for it is not" – but not even to implement my own such plots would I actually accept a throne.) Maybe the poor bugger took power never dreaming a war would be necessary in his term – else he had no business seeking power with the outlook he had. I have to say as one who has been branded a bleeding heart, I sympathize with his pacifism, with his loathing for war and the waste and chaos and pain it inevitably brings. But … Hitler. "Peace in our time? Let us put it a bit more realistically. Chamberlain saved Hitler." That is a powerful condemnation.

There really are just a handful of things that can be considered incontestable facts in this world of gray areas: fire is hot, water is wet, space is vast, and Hitler was evil. What amazes me right now, what I had never really seen clearly before (not having read the book in question), is that he wrote it all down and published it for all the world to read. He laid out "his master plan" in Mein Kampf. And, apparently, most of the world went "Huh". Even some of the people who later tried to kill him apparently didn't take him very seriously. At first. It was only later that they began, some of them, to realize he was a serious threat – and some began to be very concerned about how they were going to get out of this. Stauffenberg, the most famous of the plotters, told a fellow officer, "We are sowing hatred that will visit our children one day" – the scars Nazism was leaving on Germany would shape how the country, the people, would be perceived for generations. If nothing else, they wanted to make it clear that the country wasn't homogenous, that there were attempts to put a stop to it. That didn't really work, either, really. "Notwithstanding all of their efforts and sacrifice, most Germans still followed Hitler to the bitter end."

One of my earliest memories – and I wonder now how this has shaped my psyche – is of looking through the railing of the upstairs hall into the living room where my father was watching a documentary about the Holocaust, and seeing people being put into ovens. (It's a wonder that Hansel and Gretel doesn't send me screaming into the night.) I remember my complete and utter shock when we finally got around to learning something in history class - six million people were killed? But – how – surely not – six million?? And – wait – what? The US turned away shipsful of refugees, sent them back to what was very likely their deaths? Impossible. Not my country. Disillusionment, thy name is high school.

I've come a long way in terms of what I know since that day in tenth grade, but my heart hasn't changed much. It seems like every time I read or watch anything on World War II I learn some new horrifying tidbit I'd never heard of before. This book follows the pattern: "fifteen hundred [Polish] Jews, including women and children, had been intentionally frozen to death while being transported in open trucks". That apparently was not uncommon.

And, fortunately, there were those within WWII Germany to whom this was as unacceptable as it is to me, here, now. There were those who … like an American electorate I could name … thought that the worst couldn't possibly happen, that a megalomaniac fool could never get control of everything, who were baffled and stunned by the megalomaniacal fool's victories … "The masses are ruled by idiotic indifference" is an extraordinarily relevant quote. There were those within WWII Germany who were horrified at the atrocities being committed daily – and there were those whose point of view was more along the lines of if this country continues to allow, and to commit, such acts, when this war is over we will never be allowed to lift our heads again.

Something that puzzles me – kind of random, entirely apart from "how did Tr - er, Hitler gain power and how did he keep it" (which was addressed by the author: "As a soldier, Stauffenberg could not vote, but even a year before, in 1932, he preferred Hitler for president over Hindenburg. Just like many other German conservatives, he believed that the new leader would moderate his views after taking power". Sound familiar?) – is … whenever conspirators were caught and interrogated, I wonder why they didn't try throwing someone like Goebbels or Himmler under the bus.

The through-line of the book, of course, is summed up by the title: the plots against Hitler. Whatever might be said or conjectured about the characters or steadfastness of the plotters, there were certainly plots – and, obviously, since he survived to take his own life, all of the plots failed. This could easily have swerved off into something like the way I started this review – there must have been some supernatural thing or power making each plot fail when, on paper, it should have succeeded.

The writing is solidly written, obviously well-researched and scholarly while still maintaining an almost conversational tone at times. The main thing that made it hard to read was the obviously dreadful subject matter; I had to take a break for a while. The even temporary triumph of evil is hard to stomach. But, perhaps, there are lessons that can be taken from it. Even evil which seems to overcome all obstacles does not last forever. And there are always people, even in amongst those at the heart of it, who see it for what it is. And even if attempts to destroy it don't work, even if it oozes out from under all attempts to crush it, it will implode.

There's always hope. Even when it really, really doesn't seem like it, there is hope.

I hope.

The usual disclaimer: I received this book via Netgalley for review.
… (lisätietoja)