Sheilagh Ogilvie
Teoksen The European Guilds: An Economic Analysis tekijä
Tietoja tekijästä
Sheilagh Ogilvie is Professor of Economic History at the University of Cainclude State Corporatism and Proto-Industry: The Wrttemburg Black Forest 1590-1797 (Cambridge 1997) and A Bitter Living: Women, Markets, and Social Capital in Early Modern Germany (2003).
Tekijän teokset
Institutions and European Trade: Merchant Guilds, 1000-1800 (Cambridge Studies in Economic History - Second Series) (2011) 31 kappaletta
Germany: A New Social and Economic History Volume 2: 1630-1800 (Germany Vol. 2) (1996) 15 kappaletta
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- female
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Tilastot
- Teokset
- 8
- Jäseniä
- 114
- Suosituimmuussija
- #171,985
- Arvio (tähdet)
- 3.9
- Kirja-arvosteluja
- 1
- ISBN:t
- 19
This isn't an easy way to write a book because it could easily degenerate into a mere recital of weakly connected citations, but the author joins the disparate sources together masterfully into a concise whole. Not many historians balance their detailed source material with broad general arguments as skillfully as she does. It is clear that she has studied economics and social science more widely than any history curriculum would require, and she puts all of that knowledge to good use. As far as the methodology of historical writing is concerned, this book therefore sets a new standard and I sincerely hope that other historians emulate it.
As for its subject matter, this book is an attack against overly positive views of European merchant guilds. Medieval merchant guilds strived for, and were often granted, commercial monopolies. Some modern historians have argued that this was a good thing because the guilds facilitated commercial security and contract enforcement, provided solutions to information problems and kept prices stable. The author challenges each of these claims in turn.
The thrust of her argument is twofold: (1) Merchant guilds were not always beneficial to the economy, and in many cases they were directly harmful. Rulers granted commercial monopolies not for reasons of efficiency, but for their own benefit. Well-organized guilds with monopolistic rights could help the king fend off political and financial threats from the nobility in return for their exclusive privileges. This collusion hindered both economic development and (this final conclusion is my own, not the author's) the emergence of political representation. (2) Alternative institutions for solving the problems of commerce existed, even inclusive ones which served everyone. They were utilized by many merchants and performed functions that state bureaucracies would later appropriate, but even though they functioned well in many places their development was slow in the shadow of the monopolies. As the author puts it: particularized trust was a substitute for generalized trust.
Just like Aristotle's works, this is a book that most readers probably would not read a second time. The reason is the same in both cases: the argument is so clear and comprehensive that when you finish the book you will consider the matter settled, at least for the next 1500 years.… (lisätietoja)