Robert Forczyk

There's a lot to like about this book, but how you really feel about it will depend on how you feel about Forczyk's outlook as a writer, as it's best described as acerbic. He starts out early, by making no apologies for bringing more contemporary military theory than the typical "academic" or "general" reader might be comfortable with to his writing, which comes off as patronizing for me, but then ruthlessly applies those same standards to the period flag-rank commanders, and really takes no prisoners. At various points Forczyk refers to Erwin Rommel as being "egomaniacal" and a "con man," and certainly promoted beyond his abilities. On the other hand, less controversially, most of the British commanders get criticized for lack of energy and a failure to understand combined-arms warfare; even the men who beat the Italians in 1940. In fact, the Italians come off rather better in this book than one generally sees; at least Forczyk detects a determined effort to learn from mistakes and improve.

Apart from that, Forczyk keeps coming back to issues of logistics, training, and communication, emphasizing that unless you have these aspects of military art in order, you're unlikely going to be successful in regards to mechanized warfare.

As for what I'd criticize, I do wonder if Forczyk is always in control of his material, as he is trying to cover a lot. I've seen reviews that have "dinged" Forczyk on some factual issues that are mostly small scale. At some points, Forczyk also might have wanted to step back from issues with doctrine, operations, and tactics and consider the general strategic picture. Yes, too many resources were being thrown at North Africa by the powers in question, but for the British this was the best war they had to convince the Americans that they were serious (and Churchill was never going to write off holding the British Empire together), and the German military high command still felt stung by the escape of the BEF from France in 1940, and North Africa in 1941 was the best way to collect prestige points. Still, this an advance over what the general reader has probably read about this campaign, Forczyk actually makes the most use yet I've seen of Italian sources, and I'm looking forward to seeing that the second half of this study is like.… (lisätietoja)

Though, in part, this booklet reads with all the grace of a staff report, it appears to be the best account of this siege from a tactical perspective that you're likely read in English. Apart from that, Forczyk does a good job of demonstrating that neither side really had the manpower, or the logistical resources, to be fighting this battle; not that this prevented Hitler or Stalin from throwing away resources that could have been better spent elsewhere. As Forczyk also notes, if this particular fight is remembered for anything, it is for being the first German effort to conduct the resupply of an isolated garrison by air; the lesson that should have been learned that it was a barely adequate solution and the real answer was to quit on a failing operation before it was too late.… (lisätietoja)